In a brand new strategic briefing published by The Henry Jackson Society, I discuss the condition of Britain's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities, tracing the history of British COIN and assessing why things went so badly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and outlining policy decisions that could improve our approach.
This briefing argues against the notion that insurgency has undergone strategic shifts and, by extension, argues that the core of the 'British way' in COIN remains relevant in the face of contemporary contingencies. This briefing then puts forward the case for COIN as a concept; arguing that a less expensive counterterrorism strategy fails to change facts on the ground in the manner of population-centric COIN.
Finally, in order to move what is a solid historical foundation forward into a COIN approach that is successful once more, this briefing outlines 4 viable policy areas which require focused improvements: military efficiency; civilian-agency efficiency; multilateral operations; and strategy.
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by Dane Vallejo