European Pipedreams

Asking the Russians not to block Nabucco and to accept that the Southern Corridor (the project proposed to link Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Europe) is no threat to Moscow’s own South Stream proposal for European energy diversification is a futile exercise.  It may be true that construction of the gigantic Nabucco pipeline need not necessarily mean the writing on the wall for South Stream, but the Russians will no doubt be more concerned with keeping the European market captive in the long term.

Thus, while EU Energy Commissioner, Gunther Oettinger has endeavoured to assert that Moscow shouldn't pressure gas-rich nations in the Caspian region and to imply that South Stream and the Southern Corridor could co-exist peacefully, these sentiments are bound to fall on deaf ears.  As pointed out by Philip Lowe, EU Commission Director-General for Energy, at a lecture hosted by The Henry Jackson Society on Monday night, the Russians do not like talk of diversification unless it concerns diversification of routes with one end firmly in the Federation.  Diversification of suppliers is a whole new brand of vodka – and, I might add, a brand that is not to the Kremlin’s veteran taste.

Expecting the Russians to give their full blessing to Nabucco is therefore unrealistic.  In fact, Moscow would sooner see Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan send their gas East, to China – a market perceived by many as the future apple of Gazprom’s eye – than to see it head West to Russia’s traditional market (a move which would significantly loosen Russia’s grip on Europe).

Of course, this shouldn’t discourage the EU’s attempts at diversification which is, after all, an integral feature of its energy security policy.  But what it does mean is that despite Gazprom Chief, Alexei Miller’s recent proclamation that the Russians “have nothing against Nabucco”, expecting their full support any time soon is a pipedream too far.

Towards Afghan Autonomy

Whilst events in Japan and Libya continue to dominate the headlines, today’s announcement from President Hamid Karzai that Nato controlled areas, including Lashkar Gah, will be handed over to Afghan forces from July deserves equal attention. While the anti-war brigade may be celebrating, it is the counterinsurgency strategists that deserve the plaudits. The surge currently being led by General David Patraeus has helped ensure the Taliban fall firmly on the back-foot. 

Let’s be clear. This is not Vietnam redux. The withdrawal of foreign troops is not the negative drawdown akin to previous campaigns. The handover to domestic forces marks a positive and necessary step in any counterinsurgency operation as logic dictates that indigenous forces must be prepared to assume the military mantle. 

As Karzai himself has asserted, the people of Afghanistan don’t want foreigners taking responsibility for their national security indefinitely. The announcement today marks the first step on this tumultuous transitional road. Current Afghan forces numbering some 300,000 look set to increase to 378,000 in the coming months as the fledgling democracy aims to fortify its long-term defenses against violent extremists. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has pointed out that reasserting Afghan control over the country’s destiny marks a step on the journey, not the destination. A vital step.

Nearly a decade after the United States overthrew the Taliban, the reinstallation of domestic security forces across the country marks a major positive milestone as Afghanistan seeks a return to autonomous control.


by David Fairhurst

This blog was originally posted by The Henry Jackson Society, 22/03/11, accessed http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1145 

Afghanistan: the winnable war worth winning

The discourse surrounding the concept of a no-fly-zone in Libya has dominated our airwaves, our print and has been put firmly, and quite literally, on the map by David Cameron and William Hague.  Yet, while its significance must not be down-played, the discourse runs the risk of clouding our focus on another military intervention in existence: Afghanistan.  Time to refocus.

Slating the war in Afghanistan has become as popular as the phenomenon of micro-blogging.  Indeed, to hijack and renovate a metaphor once used by historian, Basil Liddell Hart, if the “anti-imperialist”* mindset is the mother of all disparagement vis-à-vis liberal intervention and, by extension, the war in Afghanistan, then social media such as twitter has been its most recent midwife. 

The pattern generally goes as follows: successes are reported from the field and assume the role of the lure on the track as scores of micro-bloggers come tearing out of the traps like a band of excitable greyhounds.  “Crusaders”, “imperialists”, “cultural suppressors” - some of the more popular phrases bandied about.  There are, of course, disapproving voices in government, academia and the professional media regarding Afghanistan; social media is not alone.  But social media gives us an insight into the mind set of the ordinary man on the street; it’s his outlet of choice; it tells us where he stands.  Right now it’s helping to show us that the man on the street is, more often than not, standing with his back turned against the war.  In a telling statistic, just across the pond, nearly two-thirds of Americans no longer see any value in this corner of Central Asia. 

Accordingly, Petraeus’ recent musings regarding an upturn in fortunes in Afghanistan will no doubt be subject to ridicule, disbelief and, in some instances, plain ignorance by scores of disgruntled micro-bloggers amongst others.  But he’s not often wrong. 

The Taliban are indeed on the back-foot.  NATO forces have fought bravely to reclaim critical areas such as districts west of Kandahar city and areas of Helmand Province; areas which, in 2008, were responsible for some 80 percent of global poppy supply, a colossal 7,700 metric tons, fuelling a mutually beneficial (and at times direct) relationship between drug traffickers and the Taliban.  These forces have performed commendably in this role as security enforcers, but it is, of course, patently apparent that NATO neither can nor wishes to fill this security vacuum forever.  Successful counterinsurgency dictates that indigenous forces must take on this mantle in the long term and, today, there is light at the end of this particular tunnel.  The US, for example, remains on course to be able to begin draw-downs in July, shifting the emphasis from foreign intervention to Afghan self-security.  The UK looks to be on a similar track.  Meanwhile, Afghan forces are becoming progressively more able to take on this role, growing both in size and capability.  There are currently over 300,000 Afghan forces, a figure which is hoped to increase to some 378,000 so as to further fortify the country against violent extremists long after NATO forces have returned to their respective shores.  What these gains roughly equate to is a security campaign that is being won; slowly, often painfully, but it is being won.  

Yet, winning in Afghanistan is more than a question of security.  To win this war, we must recognise the nexus between security, development and governance and bring it to fruition.  This is not only possible, but within sight.  In light of this, Petraeus is correct, once again, in highlighting the importance of funding to the State Department and USAID.  These government agencies, as with their British counterparts, the FCO and DFID, must now take on an increasingly important role, using the improved security environment as breathing space to better integrate development and governance into the classic three-pronged counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.  This will take time; this will take effort; and this will take money, but it will be worth the expenditure in all three regards given that it is our only route to peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Understanding this is paramount and we should be at pains in our efforts to promote this reality.  This is a winnable war worth winning.  The value is there, not only for the Afghan people, not only for the sake of regional or international security, but for the credibility of the West too.  If we throw in the towel, we seal the West’s fate as the civilization that can be deterred through violent means.  Doing so will create one winner - not the man on the street who calls for an end to the war, but the extremist who fights on the other side.  Not much of an option, is it?

*Disclaimer: the “anti-imperialist” mindset does not necessarily dictate that interventionists are indeed imperialists!


by Dane Vallejo

Thieves by day, terrorists by night...necessary in between

The rationale behind Hamid Karzai’s ongoing campaign against private security firms and the approach he has taken range from senseless to actually quite sagacious, which is exactly why a compromise must be found in the middle...

The latest showdown between Kabul and private security firms (PSF) operating in Afghanistan has seen a government probe accuse 16 firms of major violations.  For those unfamiliar, I say “the latest showdown” as this episode is but one of many that can be broadly categorised as an incremental campaign, headed by President Karzai, to push PSFs out of Afghanistan.  

Described by Karzai as “thieves by day” and “terrorists by night”, PSFs have garnered a reputation for acting outside of the law through infringements such as hiring too many guards, evading taxation and maintaining unregistered weapons and vehicles through to more grave violations including the alleged killing of citizens.  It seems the murky world of legitimate mercenaries has, once or twice, blurred with the often controversial world traditionally associated with paramilitaries. 

Perhaps it is reasonable therefore that Karzai should wish to assert Afghan autonomy and allow Afghan security forces to take responsibility for the security of their own nation.  After all, a crucial component of any counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is to train indigenous forces and transfer responsibility to them over time.  We neither can nor want to stay in Afghanistan indefinitely.

Yet before you mistake me for a romantic idealist, allow me to pop your bubble.  PSFs are integral supplementary cogs in the ISAF machine.  25,000 individuals are employed by PSFs in Afghanistan; 19,000 by the US military alone.  That is a lot of boots, covering a lot of ground.  These forces provide security for military bases, logistical lines, aid organisations and any number of necessary contingents.  With the draw down of ISAF forces a constant topic of conversation and action at home, the role played by PSFs in filling the security vacuum in Afghanistan becomes all the more apparent.  While his rationale is therefore understandable, Karzai’s plans for the dissolution of the private security sector are both premature and perilous.

But this assessment should not assign impunity to PSFs.  Yes – they are important; no – they are not above the law.  Perception counts for much in COIN and legitimacy is therefore key.  Failure to recognise this fact can taint mercenaries with the brush of paramilitaries and forge a slippery road to defeat.  Take for example, the controversial role played by the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC ) in Colombia.  While considered by Bogotá to be a central component in its war against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the AUC has time and again flagrantly crossed legal boundaries, incensing human rights groups and more importantly, driving sympathy for the left-wing Guerrillas.  COIN 101; don’t steer the population into the arms of the insurgent.

And so, if the risks of dissolution and impunity represent the extreme ends of the scale, then the solution lies between.  PSFs have a role to play in Afghanistan and will do for the foreseeable future, but they must act within the confines of Afghan law.  Perhaps Karzai’s nuanced stance which now seems to favour hefty fines over dissolution indicates that he is swapping intransigence for understanding.


by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 09/02/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1086

Getting the Southern Corridor built

The visit of EU Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan last week has been met by a largely positive response in Brussels.  Yet the incessant focus on Nabucco’s role (and by extension, Turkmenistan’s) in getting the wheels in motion on the Southern Corridor project is carried out at the expense of a more realistic short term target: such as the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).  Of course, EU policy makers need not desert the pursuit of Turkmen sources outright, but they would be better advised to take an incremental approach to Central Asian gas, securing Azerbaijan’s more attainable resources first before seeking to integrate Turkmen gas into the Southern Corridor project later.

The headline event from Barroso’s visit to Azerbaijan was the signing of a Joint Declaration on the Establishment of the Southern Corridor by the EU Commission President himself and Azerbaijani President Aliyev.   The Declaration, Azerbaijan’s first written commitment to supplying European markets, is set to ensure that “the EU will directly receive Azerbaijani gas,” said Barroso who also claimed that "this new supply route will enhance the energy security of European consumers and businesses."  Yet, it is not really news as such.  That is, the concept of Baku fulfilling the role of gas supplier to European markets is no real breakthrough.  In fact, this scenario has been on the cards throughout the past decade as Azerbaijan has consistently looked at means of diversification away from Russia and the post-Soviet space and toward the West, specifically the EU.

Barroso’s visit therefore, while positive in hammering out a written commitment, really ought to have focused on achieving greater clarity in regard to the path ahead. With three major projects on the table, robustness and commitment must be built into consensus on a concrete option in order to push the overall Southern Corridor project forward.

The Italy-Turkey-Greece Interconnector (ITGI) is one option, with the smallest proposed capacity of the three, at less than 10bcm.  At the opposite end of the scale, the Nabucco pipeline has the biggest proposed capacity (31bcm), is the most widely touted and also enjoys the most backing from the European Union.  Somewhere in between in terms of capacity lies TAP.

With capacity ranking below that of Nabucco (up to 20bcm) and backed by a consortium consisting largely of non EU elements from Norway and  Switzerland, TAP is less widely supported in Brussels than its larger competitor.  Some even go as far as to say that TAP is ‘astrategic’ from an EU point of view.  However, to draw such a conclusion would be to ignore the numerous risk-reducing facets tied into the TAP project; facets which EU policy makers must consider seriously.

For example, TAP has been designed to accommodate for reverse flow of gas thereby protecting the EU market from future gas cut offs.  This feature can be viewed as something of a geopolitical insurance policy for the EU which has had its fingers burnt by cut offs associated with the Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-Belarusian disputes in 2008/9 and 2011 respectively. TAP also has a realistic schedule in comparison to the competing pipelines, including ITGI.  Nabucco’s colossal length will of course incur logistical headaches and will prove expensive and time consuming to construct (2015 would be an optimistic estimate for when construction might commence).  But even ITGI, which is shorter and smaller in terms of capacity, will require an additional 800 km of new construction compared to TAP’s relatively modest 520km.

Most significantly, however, TAP does not initially require gas from anywhere other than Azerbaijan meaning that construction on the Southern Corridor can begin, without further delay, on a dual track alongside further negotiations with Turkmenistan. 

The issue at hand here is really a question of volumes.  The viability of Nabucco’s proposed 31bcm capacity necessarily requires gas from sources other than Azerbaijan, principally Turkmenistan or Iraq.  However, the political landscape in the former two is volatile to say the least.  For example, in order to reach consensus on supplies for Nabucco, it is imperative that the Serdar/Kyapaz gas field dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan be resolved.  Despite Ashgabat seeking an international arbitrator to resolve the issue, it seems that there is no resolution in sight.  Thus, while the Turkmens are currently interested in the Southern Corridor project, there remains a web of complexity inhibiting the EU’s ability to bring them in immediately.  With China looming as an alternative market for Turkmen gas (a relationship which is already well established due to the ongoing construction of the Central Asia – China pipeline,) sentiments could quickly change in favour of the East at the expense of Nabucco.  On the contrary, construction on TAP can begin without significant delay.

Having garnered a reputation for being better at discussing policy initiatives than actually implementing them, the EU must react quickly to the opportunities in Central Asia so as to demonstrate its credentials as a serious energy trading partner.  In this instance, time is of the essence as China offers a genuine alternative market to Azerbaijani gas as well as to the Turkmen’s.  The pace of negotiations on the Southern Corridor to date have left Baku feeling rather snubbed and frustrated to the extent where officials at the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) have been compelled to consider the option of exporting hydrocarbons eastward to China and other East Asian markets instead.  Several Chinese oil companies have been awarded permits by SOCAR to work in Azerbaijan such as Shengi Oil which received permission in June 2004 to operate the Garachukhur oil field. 

If the EU wishes to keep Baku looking west, then it needs to make a significant move in the relative short term. These factors need to be recognised by European policy makers who should be pushing for consensus on the most realistic proposal as soon as possible.  As alluded to above, beginning construction on TAP need not be at the expense of access to Turkmenistan’s resources.  On the contrary, it will consolidate Europe’s status as a reliable trading partner and open the Southern Corridor with a view to future integration with Turkmen gas.

by Dane Vallejo

This article was originally published by New Europe, 06/02/11, accessed at http://www.neurope.eu/articles/Getting-the-Southern-Corridor-built/104600.php

India to limit its foreign defence dependence - still an opportunity for the West

To step ahead in world politics, India needs defence modernisation and limitation of its dependence on foreign suppliers. The West can turn this shift into an opportunity...

With the Chinese having unveiled their latest piece of high-tech military hardware – the stealth bomber – last week, the pressure is well and truly on for India to step up to the mark. It is becoming more and more evident to the Indian authorities that if the country does not develop its own military arsenal, limiting its dependence on foreign-made weapons, it will never manage to evolve into a significant pole in the international order.  However, its defence production is still in its infancy. 

   India has emerged as a major arms purchaser in the past few years.  The pace of acquisition and defence modernisation is nonetheless relatively slow.  India seeks a larger role in global politics; therefore, this large-scale dependence is only holding them back.  According to the Indian Minister of Defence, Mr Antony, foreign suppliers provide about 70% of Indian arms.  India’s government wishes to limit this dependence by attracting private domestic companies into building weapons, while also strengthening state-owned companies.  Last year the government issued repeated policies designed to attract the country’s private firms into making arms for its forces.  So far, lack of policy clarity has restricted the participation of the private companies.  Of the 30% of defence supplies procured domestically, the private sector barely supplies 9%.

   One recent development in the right direction is the launch of the light combat aircraft Tejas, which is considered worthy of induction into the Indian air force.  It just received its initial operational clearance certificate, while more aircrafts are about to be inducted by the end of the year. Tejas are expected to replace the Russian MiGs, however some analysts are not yet convinced.

   It is in the West’s best interest to have a strong India in the region, a country that is becoming a trustworthy ally.  Currently, India is spending about $11 billion on buying arms not only from US and Israel, but also from Russia and others.  Western countries can urge India to limit the dependence on Eastern suppliers, and at the same time, can invest in R&D, which is a sector within India that definitely needs a boost.

by Madalena Papadopoulou

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 14/01/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1051

This is our foot; don't shoot!

As maverick Cowper-Cowles struggles to keep a lid on it, a wider question regarding support for our troops arises...

Serial maverick, Sir Sherard Cowper-Cowles has been at it again.  This time, it’s the army in his crosshairs.  Launching a war of words on Sir Richard Dannatt, Cowper-Cowles has branded the former Army chief a liar and effectively accused him of launching troops into Afghanistan for the end of protecting the army’s raison d’être.  “Use them or lose them,” Cowper-Cowles attributes Dannatt as saying; a point which the latter fervently denies.

Let’s step aside from the pantomime script – “oh no I didn’t,” “oh yes you did!” – we cannot possibly know how much truth is in these statements.  But there is a wider issue at hand.  Cowper-Cowles, a staunch critic of the ongoing campaign in Afghanistan, is bashing the forces at a time when support is needed. 

Public opinion, a key factor in any war launched by a democratic state, is particularly vital in counterinsurgency (COIN) environments.  Fighting wars deemed by the public to be ‘non-existential’, thousands of miles from home, for notoriously long periods of time (let us not forget that no successful COIN campaign has been won in anything short of a decade) will always be challenging.  Add the mix the fact that gains are incremental and subtle and that losses are tragic and widely reported and the public’s patience can become something of a proverbial ticking time bomb.  But in this case, it ought not to be.

British forces are in Afghanistan for pragmatic strategic reasons.  Whether Dannatt feared for the survival of his institution or not, trashing the campaign and pulling the plug on Afghanistan now would be both morally and strategically negligent.  Having toppled the barbaric Taliban regime, the Coalition has a moral obligation to stay the course and ensure security for Afghans so as to create the necessary breathing space for governance and development to mature and prosper.  At the same time the strategic significance, which has been well documented, is equally vital.  To recap, not only must we bring stability to Afghanistan as a means of battling Islamic extremism and its by-product of terrorism, but there is also a genuine obligation to ensure stability in a state which borders nuclear Pakistan and shares a feral tribal region in between.  Cutting our losses now would not only allow the Taliban a potential route to regional power, but it would also have a disastrously negative impact on our credibility which is vital in deterring future threats.

Military power and strategic guidance is not always enough to win in war if passion is found wanting.  Thus, Cowper-Cowles’s comments are not only unnecessary and untimely, but they are potentially hazardous if one considers the fine balance we are currently maintaining between fighting a worthwhile war and a near total collapse of public support.  Now is the time to tip the seesaw in favour of the former and see it through.

by Dane Vallejo


Originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 14/01/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1050  

British COIN down against the US dollar

Britain's approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) is equal to any, including that of the US.  Where it differs is in the amount of resources we have to throw at the problem...

Several weeks ago now, another ‘Wikileak’ brought us news that the US and Hamid Karzai had criticised British counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan.  It got me thinking, after failure in Iraq’s Multi National Division (South East) (MND(SE)) and well documented struggles in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, were these latest criticism another striking blow for British COIN?  I decided, no, not really.  More of a repeated underlining of the fact that without the correct resourcing, COIN is a non-runner.  British performance in Afghanistan since the turn of the year is testament to the fact that with the correct force density, Britain is still up there with the COIN elite.

The criticism coming from US General Dan McNeill was hard to stomach over my breakfast and that is no slight on McNeill’s character.  This is criticism coming from a highly decorated and competent soldier whose opinions should be valued.  Yet, it was only four years ago that the US was the King-Kong of COIN.  All conquering?  No; clumsy, power-oriented and scaring locals left, right and centre.  In fairness to them, the US now seemingly ‘get’ COIN.  Its army has taken on a rapid learning curve; identifying its weaknesses, reaching consensus on how to address these weaknesses, codifying doctrine to bridge the gap and then effectively diffusing new doctrine.  The result has been a highly resourced army that is focused on the centre of gravity in COIN (the population) and that adheres to all the associated principles; minimum force, political supremacy, intelligence lead ops and so on.  What we can best learn from the Americans relates to the former point; resources.

We do not necessarily need a tactical or organisational rethink.  We have been ‘getting’ COIN for decades.  The brick wall we hit in Iraq and the formative periods of Afghanistan has more to do with money and boots on the ground than it does with tactics.  What we need is a strategic rethink.  That means the thinking needs to come from the top; from politicians as well as top army brass.

COIN is inextricably resource intensive.  In order to beat an insurgency, one needs not only ‘clear’ an area, yet ‘hold’ it, and ‘hold’ it well.  COIN is about development and governance as much as it is about security.  Yet, the former cannot be achieved without the latter.  In order to keep ‘the people’ safe, therefore, boots on the ground are needed; lots of them.

And so it is imperative to understand that McNeill’s criticism, and indeed Karzai’s, came at a time when British forces were chronically underfunded.  Sangin was, and continues to be, a uniquely challenging area in which British forces fought bravely and so, the handover to US Marines does not mark a failure.  It merely marks a logical move, allowing an equally brave force to ensure security with the backing of better resourcing. 

How do we match that in Britain?  Throw more money into the military?  We all know that is not going to happen.  The answer lies in efficiency; in our own and in partnerships and coalitions.  We must simply get better at working within a framework of sound strategy in unison with our partners so as to compensate for what is an unbridgeable gap for an Island and army of our size.  Turning the corner in Helmand throughout 2010 shows that working in unison within a coalition such as NATO can, and indeed does, work.

by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 03/12/10, accessed at http://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/The-Henry-Jackson-Society/155214731155612

Replacing Boots with 'Bots; let's not lose sight of strategy

The use of drones in the fight against the resurgent Taliban should be welcomed, but with caution as machines cannot replace man in realising strategic goals on the ground...

Logic would appear to dictate that any enemy killed in war is ‘one-up’.  Sometimes logic is misleading.  Drone attacks being employed by NATO forces along the AfPak border should be viewed with a cautious eye against the backdrop of NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The questions we have to ask ourselves include: what are we doing in Afghanistan?  What do we want to achieve?  How might we achieve it?  This is what should dictate our strategy; not an obsession with enemy forces and killed in action (KIA) stats.

And so, a further question arises; what utility do we actually get from drones?  Off the bat, it is safe to say that technological advances are crucial to success in 21st century warfare.  As our enemies increasingly conform to the profile of non-state, clandestine and unconventional entities, it is important that we use technology to our own advantage to ensure success.  By all means, use drones; but use them well.

Accordingly, we should end all talk of machines replacing man in war, right here.  If we want to shroud ourselves with the facade of alien invaders who are literally killing people from the skies, then we ought to go ahead and replace boots with ‘bots.  But that won’t achieve our goals.  If we actually want to achieve some political aims in war (a point which is unnervingly unobvious to some) then the boots have to stay as well. 

Effective use of drones necessarily means integration into broader counterinsurgency (COIN) operations including security, development and governance.  Otherwise, chasing insurgents from the sky across the unforgiving FATA terrain will turn counterinsurgency into counterterrorism; the two are quite different.  That is, of course, what NATO forces are currently doing; integrating drones within a COIN campaign.  But with NATO withdrawal seemingly ever nearing, the future may not conform to such a healthy balance.

‘Bots may kill efficiently, they may spare lives and they may not evoke the war-changing reaction from public opinion at home that losses to our brave troops inevitably do.  But equally, they cannot win us wars alone.  The war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda is proving tough, gruelling and long, but bringing troops home and giving drones a centre stage will turn war into an abstract numbers game; a game in which we would be destined to lose.

by Dane Vallejo


This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 07/12/10, at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1011