Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Europe. Show all posts

Wednesday, 30 March 2011

European Pipedreams

Asking the Russians not to block Nabucco and to accept that the Southern Corridor (the project proposed to link Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Europe) is no threat to Moscow’s own South Stream proposal for European energy diversification is a futile exercise.  It may be true that construction of the gigantic Nabucco pipeline need not necessarily mean the writing on the wall for South Stream, but the Russians will no doubt be more concerned with keeping the European market captive in the long term.

Thus, while EU Energy Commissioner, Gunther Oettinger has endeavoured to assert that Moscow shouldn't pressure gas-rich nations in the Caspian region and to imply that South Stream and the Southern Corridor could co-exist peacefully, these sentiments are bound to fall on deaf ears.  As pointed out by Philip Lowe, EU Commission Director-General for Energy, at a lecture hosted by The Henry Jackson Society on Monday night, the Russians do not like talk of diversification unless it concerns diversification of routes with one end firmly in the Federation.  Diversification of suppliers is a whole new brand of vodka – and, I might add, a brand that is not to the Kremlin’s veteran taste.

Expecting the Russians to give their full blessing to Nabucco is therefore unrealistic.  In fact, Moscow would sooner see Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan send their gas East, to China – a market perceived by many as the future apple of Gazprom’s eye – than to see it head West to Russia’s traditional market (a move which would significantly loosen Russia’s grip on Europe).

Of course, this shouldn’t discourage the EU’s attempts at diversification which is, after all, an integral feature of its energy security policy.  But what it does mean is that despite Gazprom Chief, Alexei Miller’s recent proclamation that the Russians “have nothing against Nabucco”, expecting their full support any time soon is a pipedream too far.

Monday, 28 March 2011

The German Gap in EU Common Policy

Q:  What’s coveted by many in London, yet seemingly out of reach and usually denied at the hands of the Germans?  A:  A united EU foreign policy (half a point if you were thinking the World Cup). 

It wasn’t so long ago that France was bound by the ankle to Germany under the unwanted banner of “old Europe”.  Fast-forward a decade or so and Sarkozy is the new poster-boy for liberal-intervention with Cameron closely in-tow; but where’s Merkel?  It has been suggested that the premier of Europe’s economic powerhouse was left flat-footed due to domestic pressures.  Others speculate that she is constrained by the millstone of a post-WWII strategic culture defined more by pacifism than assertiveness weighing heavily round her neck.  Meanwhile the spin-doctors have been hard at work peddling the preoccupation with Fukushima as the defining rationale.  To cut a long story short, there’s a lack of consensus.  Regardless, the fact on ground (or be it sky) is that there is no black, red and gold to be seen above Libya.

Can we handle Gaddafi without the Germans?  The answer is, we might hope, a resounding yes.  But can the EU handle German absence in its search for a united foreign policy?  Is that even a question that needs asking?

Merkel may blame whipsawing for forcing her hand, yet, on this occasion, the backlash from her decision is now the whipsaw poised above Europe as it splits over the debate on liberal interventionism.  At least Britain can find solace in being on the right side while Germany is forced to get to grips with isolationism.


by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally posted by The Henry Jackson Society, accessed http://henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1149

Monday, 14 February 2011

Turkey's Need to Compromise & the Cyprus Issue

Turkey’s path to an EU membership is a story that goes back to 1959 when it first requested its association to the Commons market, obtained only in 1963. Since then, many ups and downs followed that led to the last decade’s stalemate. Turkey decided to change the game and bargain harder. Everybody knows how good Turks are when it comes to bargaining. But it is time that Europe realizes that when a merchant shouts that he will soon be out of stock he only intends to sell more. EU member states should set their own rules instead of struggling to play Turkey’s game. A few years ago Greece vetoed Turkey’s accession to the EU. Turkish officials, including the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yasar Yakis MP, continue to argue that all Europe wants Turkey in the Union and that the Greeks are the problem. To support this, Mr. Yakis has argued that Jacques Chirac has said in the past that “the EU, as a free trade union, could survive without Turkey, but if it wanted to perform a global responsibility it had to work together with Turkey”[1]. This only confuses whoever is listening. Mr. Chirac expressed the views of almost every European that cooperation with Turkey is essential, however, this does not necessarily mean full membership and more importantly accession without meeting the requirements set by the Union. One should not forget that Mr. Chirac wanted also to please Mr. Mustafa Bullent Ecevit, who has been his friend since their University years. But after 1999, when Greece eventually stopped vetoing Turkey’s membership, France’s official position changed considerably. In 2004, it was Chirac who stated that:

Three conditions should be met before EU membership talks with Turkey can begin: a. it must be clear that negotiations could end with much less than full EU membership, b. the French people have the ultimate right to reject Turkish membership in a referendum, and c. talks to start in 2005.

But it was not only France that raised doubts on Turkey’s prospect of entering the EU. Angela Merkel expressed the will of the majority of the Germans when she appeared very skeptical on this possibility.  After Cyprus joined the EU, veto came forth once more and Turkey’s accession reached a stalemate again. Turkey goes to great lengths to argue that a small state of several thousand people defies the will of the entire Europe, which wishes to include Turkey in the EU family. This misperception is encouraged by Turkish officials, including Mr. Yakis. The truth however, which is pretty obvious to whoever wants to see it, is that Europe hides behind Cyprus’ veto as it did when Greece opposed Turkey’s membership. It is very likely that a shift in French and German politics will be observed, which will not signal a shift in EU population feelings, but will only put a veil over the great divisions that exist in Europe when it comes to its eastern enlargement.

Turkey needs to be clear as to what it seeks. Sooner or later it will stand before the big question: West or East? Turkey is already a full member of the Islamic Conference Organization in the East and the NATO in the West. Is it in its best interests to be a full member of the EU as well? Many people argue that it is. So, instead of accusing European states of pushing them away, Turkey needs to examine the reasons why this happens and adopt policies that can bring the country closer to its European allies rather than hold them back. Maybe the requirements that EU states ask to be met by Ankara are justified.

Mr. Yakis has more or less supported in the past that Turkey should become a full member without necessarily meeting all the requirements. It is a well-known fact that, in a lot of cases, states entered the Union as a result of a political decision. This by no means implies that the requirements are there just to put gloss on the treaties! Turkey cannot possibly demand to be part of the EU without meeting those requirements, especially when it comes to corruption, the judicial system, the role of the army, human rights (minorities, fundamental liberties), and there is still a way to go in economy issues, since even though Turkey’s GDP rises, the gap between the poor and the rich gets even bigger. The government has, however, taken major steps especially in the last decade and everyone acknowledges that efforts to reform the country were made and still are so. But the problems are numerous, and thus these efforts, even if hard, are not yet enough.

Turkey should try and make more compromises because after all Germany, France, and Cyprus are already EU members and Turkey is the nation seeking to be included. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu argued two months ago that the EU needs Turkey and not the other way around. This, however, is not quite the case. Both the EU and Turkey benefit in economic terms by the Customs Union. The cooperation in energy is fulfilled through this agreement and it can be further enhanced as it is going to be in the best interest of both parties; however full membership is not required for this. Therefore, the EU does not “need” Turkey in that sense, as it is often supported by Turkish officials. The EU is not in a rush to include Turkey in all its institutions. It is Turkey that needs not to be left behind.

Turkey has recently requested more than it can get. This, of course, is understood to be the policy that Turkey has also adopted in the Greek-Turkish disputes very successfully so far. That is requesting as much as possible so that there are at least some gains. For the last few years, the EU has been asking Turkey to allow Greek Cypriot (EU) ships reach their harbors and airports. Turkey, of course, claims something in return: the recognition of a Northern Cyprus state by the Greek Cypriots.

Before continuing, it is of great importance to provide a very brief summary of how things got where they are now; Cyprus did not manage to get liberated from the Ottoman Empire after the Greek liberation revolt in 1821, and went under British control. In 1960 the independent Republic of Cyprus was established. The British influence remained strong in the island during the time when Greece and Cyprus were trying to find a way to unite. This was very difficult especially after 1967 when a coup controlled by the USA took over Greece, while the Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, wanted autonomy at the time. Moreover, there was a Turkish minority of about 18% in the island and there were a lot of violent confrontations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As early as September 1955 the UK directly involved Turkey in a three-part Conference, which took place in London, concerning the future of the island. Whether this was wise, is not within the scope of this paper to discuss.

According to the resulting Treaty, ,, Athens and Ankara had the right to intervene if there was destabilization in the island to protect either Greeks or Turks respectively. Turkey tried to invade in 1963 and in 1964 unsuccessfully, after the American President, Lyndon Johnson, blocked their initiatives. But in 1974, Turkey found an excellent opportunity: the Greek coup established a coup in Cyprus giving Turkey the chance to invade -twice- based on the aforementioned trilateral agreement. The Treaty referred to stipulated “steps or necessary means” to maintain order and did not justify military operations under any circumstances. At this time, the US President Nixon was weak after the Watergate Scandal, and Henry Kissinger dealt with the situation. But instead of just overthrowing the coup and leaving, and since the international community did not take immediate steps to subdue the situation, the Turks remained in the Northern part of the island, dividing the country de facto and establishing an independent state a few months later, which nobody has recognised since.

Even on the 10th of January 2011 the Minister of Internal Affairs and current negotiator with the EU, Mr Egmen Bayis, argued that the military is there to safeguard the Turkish citizens of Northern Cyprus, which is dubious since in the last 40 years, neither the Greeks or the Greek Cypriots has shown any intention to invade militarily and regain territories; that would be absurd. To date, a lot of efforts have been made to resolve the situation but they were unsuccessful because no side is willing to abandon its national interest in the region. Even when Turkey decided to approve the controversial Kofi Annan Plan, they did so because in part they knew that Cypriots would never have accepted it. Of course, now they claim that they were much more conciliatory than the Greeks, and are trying to show that the latter are those who do not want a solution. It is worth mentioning here that the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Ahmet Davutoglu wrote in his recent book “The Strategic Depth” -which should be translated in English promptly- that “even if there was not even one Muslim Turk there [Cyprus], Turkey would have to maintain a Cyprus Issue. No country can stay indifferent to such an island, placed at the heart of its vital space”.

Of course, all these are not to say that Turkey alone needs to try harder. The EU also has to make adequate efforts. Turkey indeed does a lot to promote democratic institutions and create solid human rights principles. At the same time the government managed to raise the GDP, tackle unemployment, and by 2012 the Turkish government estimates that it will not be under IMF control anymore. However, social inequalities remain critical. EU members should work to take Turkey to the next level by providing twining and institution-building programmes. It is in the best interests of the EU to have a solid democratic state, one that respects human rights and the western values in its southeastern borders. The EU made promises to Turkey after the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements that have not been fulfilled yet; one of the three commitments the EU made to Turkey was to provide consultations during peace time. Turkey argues that they requested such consultations twice (concerning Iraq and Georgia) but received no response. The other commitments were Turkey’s membership in the European Defence Agency and the signing of an agreement for an exchange between Turkey and the EU of classified information which, as Turkey assumes, would pave the way for Turkish participation in the planning of the ESDP (now CSDP) with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty[2]. The EU’s reply to the above is that Ankara would have to recognize that all EU members participate in the EU-NATO cooperation, Cyprus included. So the essence of the deadlock can be summarized in the following: “Greek Cyprus, representing the entire island as a full member of the EU, blocks Turkish participation in European defence institutions, such as the European Defense Agency (EDA). Turkey, a NATO member, responds by obstructing the Greek Cypriot government’s use of NATO facilities and NATO cooperation with Greek Cyprus on defence and security issues”[3].

On top of this, Turkey, in order to allow Cypriots to access Turkish harbors and airports, ask for the embargo to Northern Cyprus to stop. They are requesting de facto recognition of the state that Turkey created in 1974. The International Community does not recognize Northern Cyprus as a state, so expecting Greek Cypriots to do so, shows either unwillingness to find a solution or stupidity; and Turks are very smart. Davutoglu said recently that Turkey will not compromise on the Cyprus Issue for the sole purpose of entering the EU. This is a statement that aims to challenge the EU states to adopt harsh policies towards Cyprus.

But the question is: does the EU “buy it”? Is it willing to compromise with such illegitimate action against all international laws and pressure for de facto recognition of Northern Cyprus? Moreover, the solution that is mostly supported is a unification of the island under some kind of federation. Therefore, there is no need to recognize a state that will be incorporated into a unified Cyprus. If Turkey wants to get something in return for allowing Greek Cypriots to enter its harbors and airplanes, it could not be something utopian. In essence, the EU and Turkey should both work hard in order to tighten their cooperation and overcome the stalemate Turkey’s membership has reached. But, compromise needs to come from both sides and rhetoric, arrogance, and egos should be left aside for the common interest.

by Madalena Papadopoulou




Tuesday, 8 February 2011

Revaluing Our COIN - Moving British counterinsurgency forward in the 21st century

In a brand new strategic briefing published by The Henry Jackson Society, I discuss the condition of Britain's counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities, tracing the history of British COIN and assessing why things went so badly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and outlining policy decisions that could improve our approach.

This briefing argues against the notion that insurgency has undergone strategic shifts and, by extension, argues that the core of the 'British way' in COIN remains relevant in the face of contemporary contingencies.  This briefing then puts forward the case for COIN as a concept; arguing that a less expensive counterterrorism strategy fails to change facts on the ground in the manner of population-centric COIN.

Finally, in order to move what is a solid historical foundation forward into a COIN approach that is successful once more, this briefing outlines 4 viable policy areas which require focused improvements: military efficiency; civilian-agency efficiency; multilateral operations; and strategy. 

CLICK HERE FOR THE FULL BRIEFING 

by Dane Vallejo

Tuesday, 1 February 2011

Bringing Mladic to Justice

Serbia’s attempt to apprehend the war criminal Ratko Mladic is not merely a matter of Serbian national interest...


“We will do it in Serbia’s interest.”

These are the words of Serbian government spokesman, Milivoje Mihajlovic, referring to his nation’s increased efforts to apprehend Ratko Mladic, the former army general indicted for 11 counts of war crimes, including crimes against humanity and genocide, committed during the Bosnian war. Mr Mihajlovic’s comments reflect the fact that the arrest of Mladic is the last barrier preventing Serbia’s application process in to the EU, a goal they have been officially seeking since December 2009. The government has recently searched an apartment belonging to the son of the fugitive, having raised its reward for information leading to his capture from 5 to 10 million euros late last year as part of an expanded effort to arrest the war criminal.

 
It is a sad state of affairs that Serbia only begins to take the hunt for Mladic seriously now that it has the incentive of EU membership. This is a man wanted for the most heinous crimes, including the infamous 1995 genocide of some 8,000 Muslim boys and men in the eastern town of Srebrenica and for orchestrating the near-four year siege of Sarajevo. Unlike the man who still evades capture for the atrocities committed on 9/11, Mladic has not been hiding in the unmapped mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan; he has been residing on the turf of multicultural mainland Europe. The fact that he has been at large for so long is a disgrace to European justice and a humiliation to his victims. With the chief UN war crimes prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia, Serge Brammertz, set to travel to Serbia yet again next month to assess whether the country is doing all it can to apprehend Mladic, it is vital that he maintains the full weight of UN pressure on Belgrade.


The day that Ratko Mladic is delivered to The Hague to join his psychopathic former boss, Radovan Karadzic, will be a good day, not for ‘Serbian interests’, but for international law and criminal justice.


by Matt Jones

Wednesday, 12 January 2011

A Matter of Principle

Why Turkey must not yet be allowed into Europe...

Writing in the Guardian last year, Martin Kettle argued that it was ‘disgraceful’ that Turkey’s bid to join the European Union was moving so slowly. He thus echoed the views of Prime Minister David Cameron who, last July, expressed his anger towards those in Europe who are hostile to Turkish membership, asserting that it is ‘wrong to say that Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit in the tent’. What neither Kettle nor Cameron seems to recognise is that there are important legal and political reasons preventing Turkey from becoming a part of Europe, and until these challenges are met, its membership must be refused as a matter of principle.
Firstly, the government in Ankara maintains its illegal occupation of Cyprus, a nation already possessing EU membership. Since the forced partition in 1974, Turkey has evicted almost one-third of the original Greek-Cypriot population from their homes, imported Turks from the mainland to inhabit the territory, and persistently used aid and weaponry given to it by the United States specifically for its own defense to help with its occupation and colonization of the island. Turkey remains the only country in the world to recognise northern Cyprus as a state and maintains a 30,000 strong troop presence there to this day.
Secondly, Turkey persists in its denial of rights to the country’s Kurdish minority. Despite constituting around 18 percent of the population, the Kurds have had their language prohibited from being taught in public schools, their political parties banned, and their freedom of expression curtailed by stringent laws. Though the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made improvements on the issue in recent years, there remains a great distance to go.
Finally, the Turkish government continues to lie about the genocide of 1915, in which one and a half million Christian Armenians were systematically murdered by the Ottoman Turks. Though some may argue that what happened almost 100 years ago is unimportant today, imagine what the international reaction would be if the German government refused to accept that the Holocaust ever occurred. Like the events of 1939-45, we have pictures, original Ottoman documents, first-hand accounts of witnesses, a post-war trial, and even movie reel from the First World War to attest to the genocide of the Armenians, yet the Turkish government still peddles the lie that any violence that occurred was the product of a civil war. Moreover, thanks to its grotesque ‘Law 301’ which prohibits ‘denigration of the Turkish nation’, writers who dare to speak out about Turkish atrocities are regularly prosecuted by the government.
A country that maintains its illegal occupation of Cyprus, suppresses Kurdish rights, lies about the twentieth century’s first genocide, and incriminates its own writers for daring to speak the truth about their country’s history is not one that should be allowed into the European ‘tent’. Until the Turkish government is willing to drastically reconsider its position in regards to these important issues, Turkey is destined to remain out in the cold.
by Matt Jones

ETA - Ending Terrorist Activities? Not Likely

Eta's recently announced ceasefire should be treated like the fraud that it is...

So Eta has again declared a ‘permanent ceasefire’ in its fight to gain independence from Spain. Anyone buying it? No, me neither. Twice before Eta has announced a ceasefire ending its terrorist activities, and twice before it has returned to set off more bombs in the Iberian Peninsula. The last time, in 2006, Eta blasted its way back into the spotlight by setting off a car bomb in the parking area of Madrid airport, killing two and injuring nineteen. In fact, many analysts have suggested that past ceasefires have amounted to little more than attempts by the organisation to regroup with a view to launching further attacks.
In a recently released video from the group, three militants are seen dressed in the customary cover-all white hoods, declaring it ‘time to act with historical responsibility’. Er, no. The time to act responsibly was in the 1970s, before Eta regressed from a defender of Basque interests against Franco’s fascism, to a fascist organisation itself, complete with a theory of Basque racial uniqueness. Over the past 40 years the group has been responsible (there’s that word again) for the deaths of some 850 people in over 1,600 terrorist attacks, which consistently target Spain’s tourist attractions and cost the economy in excess of $10 billion.
The present ceasefire ruse contains no mention of dissolving the organisation - a key demand of the Spanish government – and not even an explicit reference to giving up its arms. As Rogelio Alonso, political science professor at Rey Juan Carlos I University, asserts, Eta’s statement is ‘simply an attempt to put pressure on the democratic players to negotiate their demands.’
The Spanish government has rightly rejected Eta’s truce, declaring that until the organisation disarms and renounces violence once and for all, no dialogue will be opened.  Instead, the government should continue its highly successful campaign to capture and bring to justice the leadership of the blood-stained organisation.
by Matt Jones

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 10/01/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1039 

Tuesday, 11 January 2011

British COIN down against the US dollar

Britain's approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) is equal to any, including that of the US.  Where it differs is in the amount of resources we have to throw at the problem...

Several weeks ago now, another ‘Wikileak’ brought us news that the US and Hamid Karzai had criticised British counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Afghanistan.  It got me thinking, after failure in Iraq’s Multi National Division (South East) (MND(SE)) and well documented struggles in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, were these latest criticism another striking blow for British COIN?  I decided, no, not really.  More of a repeated underlining of the fact that without the correct resourcing, COIN is a non-runner.  British performance in Afghanistan since the turn of the year is testament to the fact that with the correct force density, Britain is still up there with the COIN elite.

The criticism coming from US General Dan McNeill was hard to stomach over my breakfast and that is no slight on McNeill’s character.  This is criticism coming from a highly decorated and competent soldier whose opinions should be valued.  Yet, it was only four years ago that the US was the King-Kong of COIN.  All conquering?  No; clumsy, power-oriented and scaring locals left, right and centre.  In fairness to them, the US now seemingly ‘get’ COIN.  Its army has taken on a rapid learning curve; identifying its weaknesses, reaching consensus on how to address these weaknesses, codifying doctrine to bridge the gap and then effectively diffusing new doctrine.  The result has been a highly resourced army that is focused on the centre of gravity in COIN (the population) and that adheres to all the associated principles; minimum force, political supremacy, intelligence lead ops and so on.  What we can best learn from the Americans relates to the former point; resources.

We do not necessarily need a tactical or organisational rethink.  We have been ‘getting’ COIN for decades.  The brick wall we hit in Iraq and the formative periods of Afghanistan has more to do with money and boots on the ground than it does with tactics.  What we need is a strategic rethink.  That means the thinking needs to come from the top; from politicians as well as top army brass.

COIN is inextricably resource intensive.  In order to beat an insurgency, one needs not only ‘clear’ an area, yet ‘hold’ it, and ‘hold’ it well.  COIN is about development and governance as much as it is about security.  Yet, the former cannot be achieved without the latter.  In order to keep ‘the people’ safe, therefore, boots on the ground are needed; lots of them.

And so it is imperative to understand that McNeill’s criticism, and indeed Karzai’s, came at a time when British forces were chronically underfunded.  Sangin was, and continues to be, a uniquely challenging area in which British forces fought bravely and so, the handover to US Marines does not mark a failure.  It merely marks a logical move, allowing an equally brave force to ensure security with the backing of better resourcing. 

How do we match that in Britain?  Throw more money into the military?  We all know that is not going to happen.  The answer lies in efficiency; in our own and in partnerships and coalitions.  We must simply get better at working within a framework of sound strategy in unison with our partners so as to compensate for what is an unbridgeable gap for an Island and army of our size.  Turning the corner in Helmand throughout 2010 shows that working in unison within a coalition such as NATO can, and indeed does, work.

by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 03/12/10, accessed at http://www.facebook.com/#!/pages/The-Henry-Jackson-Society/155214731155612