Foreign Ministers, Stones, and Glass Houses

Abul Ati al-Obeidi has warned that the UK’s plan to send military advisors to assist Libyan rebels will prolong the search for peace.  Is he for real?

War: a continuation of politics by other means; a phenomenon that takes place once more diplomatic routes to conflict resolution between two adversaries are perceived to be exhausted.  In the end, it comes down to the enforcement of ones will upon another.  But crucially, this projection of will must be embedded within the condition of peace. 

Peace: the elusive condition of being that often proves so distant within hot-war environments; a condition which is reliant on the most specific of factors aligning, so as to achieve balance at a particular moment in time and the acceptance of one adversary’s will by the other (albeit sometimes more than begrudgingly).

All sounds rather migraine-inducing, doesn’t it?  Or perhaps not if your name is Mr Obeidi.  If Libya’s foreign minister is to be believed, the first step toward peace would involve keeping British (and more generally, foreign) forces off the ground in this troubled part of North Africa, for their presence will prolong the conflict and lessen the chances of an amicable resolution.  Or so he says. 

He’s wrong.  Firstly, logistical and intelligence training is a far cry from combat forces, so let’s not get the two confused.  And secondly, the 10 or so British officers pencilled in for deployment will provide only the smallest pinch of tactical respite for Libya’s rebels; a contingent that needs all the help it can get whilst up against the war machine of a state.

So, thank you for your advice Mr Obeidi, but here is mine to you: massacring thousands of your own citizens isn’t the best way to bring about peace, either.  If Mr Obeidi wants to throw stones, perhaps he should move from a house of glass to one slightly more robust, say, reinforced by the practice of human rights, liberty and democracy.

By Dane Vallejo

Originally posted by The Henry Jackson Society

Made in America: why the US should protect its own

America’s status as the world’s superpower was established in no small part from the strength and talent of our men and women in uniform. However, this cannot simply be attributed to exceptional training; we would be amiss if we failed to recognize the American companies who develop and build the equipment that our men and women use every day to ensure our national security. American ingenuity has kept us at the forefront of military technology that helps keep our soldiers safe. It is not only key to our military strength, but also to the strength of our economy.

Unfortunately, a troubling trend has made it way into the industry. In the name of a “free market” and “fair competition,” foreign companies have begun winning defense contracts at the peril of American companies. The competition is by no means “fair,” and all that is “free” is the free-ride foreign companies are getting when they receive subsidies from their governments. Because foreign companies receive money from the government, they are able to offer artificially low prices when they bid for contracts against American companies, who do not receive government aid.

We are seeing this played out right now, as Kansas-based Hawker Beechcraft competes for an Air Force contract against the Brazilian company Embrear. Embraer publically acknowledges that it receives assistance from the Brazilian government. And this is not an isolated incident – just a few weeks ago Boeing was awarded a similar contract over EADS, it’s European counterpart, but only after a controversial prolonged fight where Boeing had to overcome EADS’ unfair advantage due to government subsidies.

As our country continues to struggle to bounce back from recession, we need to ask ourselves: Should our defense spending be used to protect 1,400 American jobs, or should we allow a foreign company to produce planes in Brazil, ship the parts to the U.S., assemble them in Florida, and stamp them  “Made in America?”

Congress and the Pentagon need to know that Americans are not okay with outsourcing our military manufacturing or our national security.  The idea of supporting a company whose government has provided no assistance or support to the U.S. in fighting terrorism around the globe? The answer seems pretty clear. Support keeping America strong, and tell Washington to stop outsourcing our jobs and security.

Guest Blog by Emily McGann

Radicalism just got more radical in Iran

Question: What’s worse than having a radical Middle-Eastern regime on the nuclear threshold?  Answer: Having a radical Middle-Eastern regime on the nuclear threshold in which Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is considered “too moderate”.   It may sound like a tired rendition of some old gag, but in reality, it is no such thing.  Rafsanjani has been hounded out of his position as head of the Assembly of Experts, the powerful Iranian clerical body, following increasing pressure from hardliners who felt the ex-president was simply not radical enough to sit at the table.

Let’s get one thing straight: the scope of Rafsanjani’s liberalism was not and is not all that far reaching.  Sure, he may have implemented an “economy first” policy during his presidency, pushing back against the leftist economic inclinations of Iranian politics; he may have opposed harsh Islamic penal codes; and he may have promoted better employment prospects for women, but the latter two in particular are hardly deserving of prolonged recognition; they’re basic human rights which should be expected, not overtly applauded.  After all, would a real moderate uphold a fatwā instructing the execution of Salman Rushdie?  You get the point.

Worryingly, it wasn’t so long ago that Rafsanjani was actually considered a hard-liner and a reliable aid to Khomeini.  So what does this sudden change of labelling really tell us?  That Rafsanjani has undergone a major transition and that the margins of Iranian politics are so slim that divergence from, say, allowing the active harassment of women to ensuring that they are harassed less is sufficient enough to push one into the category of moderate over radical?  Not likely.  More probable is a different and more sinister implication that looms ominously over this whole episode: radicalism is getting worse in Iran and revelling in its role on the centre stage.

Perhaps we should call this the “bad-ish” news, because there is worse to come.  An increasingly radical Iran is one thing, but tally that with nuclear ambitions and you have a real mess.  The prospect of containing a nuclear Iran has always been a daunting one – and one that should be avoided at all costs by preventing its acquisition of the bomb – due to the complexities of Middle Eastern politics, not least its geopolitical stance toward Israel.  But the more radical Iran becomes and the more polarised from the West, the more daunting this task will become.

We’ve heard incessant reference to the Iranian revolution of 1979 over the last month given the on-goings in the Middle East today.  Perhaps our best hope is to wish for events to come full circle and take to the streets of Tehran once more; only this time, for real democracy.

by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally posted by The Henry Jackson Society, 09/03/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1128

Blood (and Oil) Brothers

As Western leaders continue to stumble and stutter over the ongoing crisis in Libya, Colonel Gaddafi has found vocal support from Latin America’s infamous gruesome twosome, Chavez and Castro. The exclusive ‘Dictator’s Club’ maintained by corrupt autocratic leaders brazenly exploiting their own national oil reserves has been quicker to mobilise support than the floundering Western leaders.

The relationship between Libya and Chavez-led Venezuela goes beyond the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Despite minimal cultural similarities, the robust anti-American sentiments that pervade the autocratic administrations in Libya, Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua has created unified sentiment under a common enemy. As the recipient of the comically paradoxical ‘al-Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights’, Hugo Chavez remains committed to ensuring the brutal subjugation of people under autocratic rule. Chavez said last week it ‘was a great lie’ that loyalist Gaddafi forces had attacked civilians fronting the opposition freedom movement, whilst the old anti-American, anti-Imperialist and irrational Fidel Castro denounced the Western media for promulgating a ‘colossal campaign of lies’ about Libya. The absurd criticism of the Western media would be funny if the enduring state-influenced media in Cuba and Venezuela weren’t so tragic.

As the spectre of civil war looms the lack of coordination between Western governments appears in stark comparison to the chummy dictators. Although the situation remains fluid, as recently as last week Catherine Ashton confirmed the EU was not willing to coordinate on military action and hadn’t even discussed the possibility of a no-fly zone.

If authoritarian dictators are willing to stand-up for their own abhorrent, greedy and repressive regimes why is it that Western leaders have struggled so laboriously to stand up for human rights and democracy?

The coordinated opposition to the lone global hyperpower has created a sense of solidarity against Western intervention. It is both scandalous and morally reprehensible that Western powers do not share the same sense of solidarity in mobilising greater action to prevent the continuing gross human rights violations across Libya.

by David Fairhurst

This blog was originally posted by The Henry Jackson Society, 07/03/11 at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1124

How many people must die before you actually act?

Can a madman who seems to pose the question “I rule you or I kill you” be convinced to withdraw by the sanctions decided yesterday by the UN Council without military back up?

Rather belated, the US decided to pose unilateral sanctions on Libya and the EU, NATO, and the UN Security Council are following suit, with the latter adopting yesterday a unanimous decision to pose tough measures on the not-so-much Jamahiriya of Libya. Up to now, an overwhelming figure of 1,000 is estimated to be the death toll according to the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Franco Frattini[1] and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon[2].

Sanctions are a useful tool in the long run and their usefulness lies in its preventive nature; that is before the escalation of a crisis. However, it is not quite effective in the short run and especially now in Libya where the situation is way out of control; let alone by itself. As Fouad Ajami of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies reminded us, Qaddafi survived sanctions before[3]. The Council decided to ask the International Court of Justice to investigate for crimes against humanity, to impose an arms embargo on Libya, and sanctions such as a travel ban and an asset freeze on the ruling elite[4]. Will these actions prevent the massacre in Libya? Is it possible that a Mad Dog who in essence poses the question “I rule you or I kill you” be restrained by such means? Hardly so. While the Western countries discuss sanctions, and until they actually implement their decisions, the number of murdered Libyans will rise and the West will share responsibility for this.

Qaddafi was in front of the urgent ultimatum, as the UK leadership suggested[5], long enough: withdraw and asylum or Hague and trial for crimes against humanity. Qaddafi has vowed to fight to his “last drop of blood” rather than abandoning its rule; there is indeed no need to wait much longer, the man responded already. Ban Ki-moon recognised that “even bolder steps might be necessary” and added that the Council’s decision “while it cannot, by itself, end the violence and the repression it is a vital step- a clear expression of the will of a united community of nations”.

From that point and on, the West needs to take immediate and decisive steps to prevent more killings. Immediately implement the decisions of the UN Council especially those related in humanitarian aid but also support the resistance forces, prepare a unified Western coalition and as Professor Bruce W. Jentleson suggests[6] wisely, include the Arab League and the African Union, and threaten for intervention. Military intervention even if risky is probably the only option to prevent the atrocious crimes currently committed in the country. That is not to suggest a full range military action but rather surgical operations such as shooting down airplanes that intend to attack protesters. Military force should back the international community’s decisions in order to be taken seriously by Qaddafi and his elite.

Let us also not forget, that if the West is truly interested in promoting democracy in the world, it has a moral obligation not only to save the Libyans from the bloody hands of their rulers but also to guarantee support for a regime change, with respect to their national integrity, providing the necessary checks and balances for the creation of a democratic state that the Libyans so righteously are struggling for.

 

by Madalena Papadopoulou

---

[1] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/world/europe/24italy.html?_r=1

[2] http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/blog/16159

[3] http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/26/libya.un/index.html?hpt=T1

[4] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm

[5] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/libya-uk-gaddafi-sas-embassy?CMP=twt_gu

[6] http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/23/libya-after-qaddafi/preparing-for-a-military-option

The Dictator Club

"What Simon Bolívar is to the Venezuelan people, Gaddafi is to the Libyan people" said one Mr. Hugo Chávez.  If it wasn’t for the gravity of around 1000 deceased at the hands of Gaddafi’s regime, one might muster a wry smile at this lunacy...

Latin American reactions to the on-goings in Libya have been split and all the more interesting as such.  On the one hand, there’s Peru which has become the first state to sever ties with Libya following Gaddafi’s repulsive response to the protests against his despotic regime.  A gold star for Lima; good work.  But before we get carried away with celebration, let’s not forget the gruesome twosome: Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez.

Castro has gone on record to criticize the West’s response to Gaddafi’s gross crackdown in Tripoli and Benghazi.  Oil, he says, is the main concern in Washington and not peace for Libya.  What is more, the US is supposedly ready to invade in "a matter of hours or a few days" according to the Cuban dictator who still runs the show behind Raul’s figurative leadership.  These are bold claims given the relative quiet that has dominated the White House since events broke.  One can only imagine that Castro’s rhetoric will spew like an erupting well now that Obama has finally reacted to events in Tripoli.

Then there’s Chávez: Latin America’s very own peculiar political performer.  Direct ties between Chávez and Gaddafi have been growing incrementally over the years and just when you thought their relationship could not get any more bizarre, it inevitably does.  Gaddafi has named a football stadium after Chávez in Benghazi; he has offered a Bedouin tent to Chávez as a warming gift; and Chávez has bequeathed a replica of Simon Bolivar’s (the championed liberator of South American independence from the Spanish) sword in return.  Ah yes, the famous Bolivar sword.  Everybody has one:  Mugabe, Castro, Gaddafi.   Somehow this symbol has perversely come to represent staunch opposition to democracy, prosperity and liberty.

So while this exclusive club of dictators hides behind the pretext of perceived Western imperialism and exploitation of their resources, it is important to recognise that their relationships really boil down to a cosy bracket designed to protect the sanctity of their own personal sovereignties.  For all of Chávez’s endeavours to endear himself to indigenous peoples and minorities worldwide, where is his support for the hundreds dead in Libya?  If “revolution for the people” is what he stands for, then where is his support for those who continue to brave the streets of Tripoli and Benghazi to force political change?  It’s very easy for me to sit here poking fun at the lunacy of these dictators and illuminate the contradictions in their ways, but there is a serious issue at hand here.  As long as there are dictators such as these, violations of human rights will continue.

This brings me to my final point.  Considering Chávez’s incessant reference to Simon Bolivar, perhaps he ought to take heed from one of Bolivar’s own musings: "Nothing is so dangerous as allowing a single citizen to remain in power for a long time. The people get used to obeying him, and he gets used to giving them orders, and that is the root of tyranny."

There is a glaring lesson in there for Chávez, Castro and Gaddafi.


by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally posted by The Henry Jackson Society, 24/02/11, at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1110 

Is Libya next?

Gadaffi's 42 year reign in Libya came under rare threat yesterday as protests flashed in Benghazi.  Following the winds of revolution across the Middle East, the question inevitably arises...is Libya the next domino to fall?

Want to know what's going on in Libya?  Looking for a short, digestible briefing?  Then click below:


CLICK HERE FOR THE FULL BRIEFING

by Dane Vallejo

Back to the Dark Ages?

The Egyptian uprising against Hosni Mubarak has been praised and championed by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as ‘following in the footsteps of the 1979 Iranian Revolution’. If this is the case- Israel too, will be forced ‘back in time’; to when neighbouring hostility was the norm, and peace was far from achievable.


For Israel, developments in the Middle East from May 2010 must seem like a bad dream. Since then, the flotilla incident ended with harsh international criticism and a major falling-out with Turkey (affecting both security, peace negotiations and energy development in the Leviathan); Palestinian peace talks have broken down to the level where not only has Israel received public stick from the US, but the outcome of failed talks has been to strengthen Hamas’ hand and weaken more moderate elements; Hizballah has managed to be ‘all-but’ indicted by the UN tribunal into Hariri’s death, yet have still strengthened their own position and toppled the Lebanese government; and now Egypt looks set to shed its label as a bastion of stability in the region, adding fears that the Muslim Brotherhood could rise to ascendancy. To top it all off, these events are even threatening to resonate into Jordan in a serious way, and that is without mentioning other regional players (although small) such as Tunisia, Algeria and Yemen.


At a time like this it is worth checking the textbooks, and in particular, Classic Israeli Military Doctrine. For those not well versed in the history of Israeli Warfare, Israeli military Doctrine- the 1948/ 67/ 73 versions- was based around the following:


the concept of pre-emption; transfer of the battle to enemy territory; the importance of a quick military decision; flexibility within the Israeli Defence Force (IDF); the premium of quality over quantity; the use of superpower support.


All of these should be seen against a backdrop of exceptionally hostile neighbours whose stated aim was to destroy Israel, along with an Israeli geographical headache of a lack of strategic depth (Israel is small and therefore it doesn’t take long to reach her vital centres).


So where are we going with all of this?


The important issue now is that if Egypt falls, and with it Israel’s peace-deal with her south-western neighbour, Israel will be surrounded by hostile regimes. That is not to say that we will see a repeat of 1967 or 1973, but the conditions that brought about this tumultuous period may well be prominent again.


Within this background, Israel may be less at ease with letting Hizballah mass troops on the northern border, yet will have to have to recognise that a ‘New Egypt’, under any direction, may not be so willing to allow Israel to exercise its force within the region with no threat of retaliatory action from Egypt.


Therefore, it will be Israel’s hope, as well as the entire Western world, that a peaceful transition into democracy within Egypt can occur, without radical elements to coming into fruition. If radicalism does take charge, then Iran may not be the only ones harking back to the days of the 1970s’, as Israel may be forced to opt for security over peace.


Here’s to hoping we don’t erase forty years of peace negotiations for the sake of ‘democratically elected’ extremists.

by John Corner

Rebuking the Romanticism of Revolution in Egypt

As Hosni Mubarak vows to stand down in September, the West should harbour stability by backing his decision, monitoring and assisting the transitional process and resisting knee-jerk reactions that call for Mubarak’s instant disposal so that democracy has a chance of lasting in Egypt...


Many of us have woken up this morning to the welcome news that Mubarak will not run for another term come September.  Queue scenes of jubilation on Cairo’s streets?  In drips and drabs, but it seems many of Egypt’s citizens are out for blood if not Mubarak’s immediate ejection at least.

However, for those of us in the West who are fortunate enough to be monitoring the situation from afar and away from the emotion, violence and anger that is currently encapsulating Cairo, a more pragmatic long term analysis is possible.

Democracy has spoken in Egypt and it must arrive.  Egypt’s protesters should be commended for their efforts and there will be few in the West who do not support their drive for change.  But for the sake of Egypt’s stability, Mubarak should retain office until September so that under the protection of continuity in governance, the next eight months can be dedicated to the achievement of a smooth transition, affording Egypt a better chance of realising the reforms that its people so clearly desire and deserve.  As part of this process, an international collaboration of states, headed by the United States, must assist Egypt in this transitional period, not only to build robustness and support into the process, but to ensure that Mubarak’s promises are kept.

As was argued in last week’s Telegraph, lessons should be drawn from the catastrophic debaathificaton process carried out by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq after the 2003 invasion.  Clearly, there are vast disparities between the political situation in Egypt today and what was then in Iraq.  Yet, the underlying theme is the same.  Mubarak may be an ineffective plaster covering Egypt’s social, economic and political wounds, but in this case, ripping that plaster away quickly will not ease the pain.  Just as Iraq plunged into chaos without the guiding hand of experienced (though admittedly brutally oppressive) governance, Egypt would be in danger of turmoil too should a sudden revolution take course over incremental reform.  The fallout would be tremendously difficult to reign in overnight.

Call me a spoil-sport, killjoy or party-pooper, but pragmatism should take precedence over the romanticism of revolution on this occasion not only for Egypt’s sake, but for the stability of the region.  Change is coming in the form of democracy, but let’s give that change a fighting chance of long term survival.


by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 02/02/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1075

Middle East Dominoes

There has been a lot of talk about the Middle East experiencing a ‘domino effect’; one that would topple some of the most long-standing government’s in the region.


The story goes that once Tunisia went rogue, Egypt was awakened, Yemen was inspired, and places such as Morocco and Algeria are next. There is a danger here, however, in failing to see that the Middle East is not one homogenous block. The cases of Egypt and Yemen in particular, show that although both countries may be experiencing many of the same problems, the differing internal dynamics of each mean that the ‘end result’ is far from predictable.


Let’s start with the similarities. It would be wrong to suggest that the Tunisian affair did not spark the current crisis witnessed in both Egypt and Yemen, and although the spark should not be confused with the cause; the issues of corruption, representation, unemployment and rising food prices do resonate throughout both Egypt and Yemen, and are not unfamiliar elsewhere in the region. Indeed, Yemen is commonly known as the Middle East’s poorest country, with up to 40% of the population living on less than $2 a day, and both countries have, in Presidents Saleh and Mubarak, leaders that have both been in power for thirty years.


There are some marked differences, however, that should be stressed. The involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood in endorsing protests against Mubarak is a significant development within Egypt. The Brotherhood, although officially banned from elections, still represent a large number of ordinary citizens, and are an organized force that can put severe pressure on the Egyptian authorities. It will be a test of the strength of the Brotherhood to see how the group deal with the returning Mohamad El-Baradei, a leader sure to grab headlines, yet may draw his supporters from a more affluent section of Egypt’s population. It remains to be seen what kind of uprising we are witnessing- if the protests are truly grassroots, then the Brotherhood will be in pole position to challenge Mubarak directly. The harsh level of police crackdowns surrounding Friday prayers seems to suggest this may be the case.


Yemen, however, faces a different sort of challenge. The protests aimed thus far at President Saleh have been extremely less violent and confrontational than those seen in Egypt; and many commentators have indicated that the public’s anger is more at conditions rather than at Saleh himself. To be sure, corruption, justice, and fair representation are ultimately the responsibility of government authorities; yet Yemen’s internal dynamic sets a Houthi movement in the north and a Southern Movement in the south, against the backdrop of a weak government in Sanaa, and a tribal system that emanates across the whole of the country, often crossing the borders of provinces or districts. In addition, the threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula adds another dynamic to the domestic workings of Yemeni politics, culture and power.


So what can we draw from these two cases?


Firstly, the nature of the uprising in Yemen and especially in Egypt needs to be noted in the coming days or even weeks. If a grass roots level campaign to oust Mubarak is gaining momentum, so too will the Muslim Brotherhood, and the likelihood of their ascension into power. For Yemen, in which direction the protests spread will be key, as although the country is no stranger to Southern Movement rebellion coming out of Aden, the ability of the government to successfully control riotous elements of society will be crucial in determining how much power the Saleh regime still has.


Linked to this is the power of both the Egyptian and Yemeni armed forces. Mubarak has traditionally held great support from within his army, and in Yemen, pay was recently increased to the military in order for their continued support. If either of the two forces start to waver in their defence of the central authorities, the end of both government’s may be nigh. Indeed, one of the most preeminent reasons that Hariri’s government fell in Lebanon was that the support of the army was not significant enough to combat Hizballah forces, meaning that those who held the military power ultimately held political influence.


Finally, it is worth monitoring the actions of the both governments to see if reform has a chance. We know from Iranian history that reforming autocratic regimes can lead to revolution, and the installation of radical groups. The West will not want either Egypt or Yemen to go down that path, as both the Brotherhood’s influence within Palestine, and al-Qaeda’s in Yemen, clearly create problems for the wider region as a whole. Indeed, not only will the West be keen to maintain stability in the region, but so too will countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE; neither of which have an unblemished record in relation to political representation.


Therefore, although the ‘domino theory’ has a catchy ring to it, it will most likely be the internal dynamics that direct the outcome of both Egypt’s and Yemen’s demonstrations, rather than an overarching wave of uprising and rebellion under a regional banner of revolution. Tunisia may have started it, but local factors will determine where the protests end up.


by John Corner

Murderers to Ministers?

Amid the remarkable turn of events which have seen Hezbollah figures implicated in the murder of Rafik Hariri, only to end up with ever more power in their hands, Lebanon’s citizens are right to take to the street in protest and deserve greater backing from the West...

A Hezbollah-controlled government would "clearly have an impact" on relations between Lebanon and the US, said Hilary Clinton in response to Najib Mikati’s ascent to prime minister-designate.  You don’t say?  Hezbollah’s ongoing ascent to the status of a serious political force is nothing short of a foreign policy catastrophe for the US and its allies.

Lebanon’s ongoing political crisis has been fairly kind on Hezbollah.  In fact, considering that a number of its members have been heavily implicated in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, Hezbollah has come out of the situation pretty well indeed. 

In accordance with the Lebanese constitution which, by design, shares power between Sunnis, Shias and Maronite Christians, Mikati is, of course, a Sunni.  Yet, having ousted Prime Minister Saad Hariri earlier this month, Hezbollah has ensured that his likely replacement falls, as much as is possible, on their side of the fence in the Sunni/Shia divide.  Has this completed the terrorist’s transition from murderers to ministers?  Perhaps not just yet, but the rise of Mikati who Nasrallah himself termed a “compromise figure” is clearly a step in the right direction for Hezbollah and a stride back for the West.

And so Lebanon’s citizens should be saluted for their political activism in taking to the streets and making their voices heard.  Protests in Tripoli, in the north of the country, were the most intense as 20 people were treated for injuries and a satellite truck used by Al-Jazeera was set ablaze.  But in Beirut also, protesters blocked a road with burning tyres and rubbish containers showing their support for Saad Hariri.

Clinton’s timid response, on the other hand, is straight out of the diplomatic textbook, when really, stronger action is needed.  Lebanon’s protestors deserve more robust support.  But more to the point, tougher action is required on an issue which is a painfully uncomfortable for the US too.  Hezbollah’s rise confirms a distressing reality for the US and its allies: Iran’s (and Syria’s) growing influence in the already notoriously unstable region.  Does a Hezbollah-controlled government “clearly have an impact,” then?  Sure.  But I can think of far more sobering ways of putting it.

by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1065

Economic Route to Iraqi Stability

Building a strong relationship with the new Iraqi government to foster security and economic stability is paramount; but the West should not lean on Iraq to counter Iran, as Iraq at present simply isn’t strong enough.
 

As we await the formation of the new Iraqi cabinet, the question of Iraq’s role in the wider Middle East, and which way it may lean in international terms, arises.  The West should concentrate on facilitating Iraq’s economic development; whilst at the same time remain central partners with the domestic Iraqi security forces.  Agreeing to remove troops and withdraw from Iraq should not mean an abandonment of the fragile state.  
 

Michael Eisenstadt has noted the decreasing number of Provisional Reconstruction Teams operating in Iraq, from 29 in 2009, to 16 in 2010.[i]  In addition, 2011 will see only two temporary Embassy Branches, in Mosul and Kirkuk, which are planned to be shut down in 3-5 years.  This would leave just two permanent consulates at Erbil and Basra, which as Eisenstadt argues, could potentially isolate the Embassy in Baghdad, and may impact detrimentally to the influence of the US in areas outside of urban centres.[ii]  
 

On the positive side, nearly all of Iraq’s governmental players (except for the Sadrists) have expressed some inclination and support for a strong US-Iraqi relationship in terms of security.  If Iyad Allawi does manage to form an effective Security Council body, then these ties have a greater chance of being realised.  What the US and Western influences should not do however, is to pressure Allawi unduly into security confrontations with Shi’ah powers in order to stifle Iran’s growing reach.  Rather, combating Iranian tentacles within Iraq, given the imminent withdrawal of forces, must be sought through regional economic cooperation and growth, and the development of a new Iraqi identity on a firm footing of domestic security. (A good test of Iraqi security will be the upcoming Ashura ceremonies, where US forces will leave all arrangements to the Iraqis).[iii]  To be sure, the West cannot afford to let Iran dominate Iraq; nor can Iraq afford a re-emergence of Baathist elements that are likely to increase sectarian divides.  Instead, Iraq must be given time and support in order to fashion its own plural identity.  To do this, security assistance from the US is needed.  So too is economic development and prosperity.  
 

Despite taking an age to form a new government, Iraq has shown the desire to increase its economic weight, and a clear sign of the government’s intent was signalled in early December with the invitation to build four large power plants in the Southern Iraqi governorates.[iv]  The aim is to increase generating capacity by 2,750 Megawatts, and is part of a larger plan to develop energy infrastructure to combat the dual problem of current power shortages, and growing domestic demand.  Indeed, Iraqi domestic demand is set to grow to 87 million barrels per day (bpd) next year, while spare oil capacity is set to fall dramatically.[v]   It is a problem that affects the entire Middle East, as the IEA forecasts a projected demand increase of 85 per cent for the region as a whole in the period 2008-2030.[vi]
 

Another example of expansion is found at Iraq’s biggest oilfield in Rumaila, where BP, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and Iraqi State owned South Oil Co have agreed to a joint project that will see the site expand to become the 2nd largest producing oilfield in the world.  As part of this, the consortium plan to triple production at the field to 2.85 million bpd.[vii]
 

The point here is not that foreign firms and Western capitalist interests are fulfilled by exploiting Iraq’s natural resources; but rather that by international investment and increased production, Iraq will benefit domestically from increased revenues, and will be bolstered within the region as a key economic hub and power.  On top of this, integrating Iraq into a wider system of international economies and trade lessens the likelihood that Iraq is manipulated by its immediate neighbours, as having a multitude of trading partners increases Iraq’s chances of maintaining its independence. 
 

For a country with such a diverse populace as Iraq, establishing a plurality of regional influences must be accomplished if sectarian divides are to be conquered, and a dissent into violence is to be avoided.  Here, growing economic ties can be used to facilitate strengthening political ties as Iraq interacts with all of its neighbours, rather than depending on a select few.
 

This may prove difficult at times for the West, as Iraq’s links to Iran, for geographical, historical and cultural reasons are very real.  There is no utility, therefore, in Western countries burying their heads in the sand and ignoring the ties, or attempting to dismantle them altogether.   Leaning on Iraq in order to pressure Iran at this premature stage of the new Iraqi state would do more harm than good to Iraq’s stability and development, and in turn, would only benefit Tehran’s hegemony within the region, turning its ‘spoiler power’ into proactive influence.[viii]
 

The West must therefore look to engage with Iraq economically, and bind the state into a system that will support stability and encourage growth.

by John Corner

---

[i] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66755/michael-eisenstadt/should-i-stay-or-should-i-go

[ii] Ibid

[iii] http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101214/wl_mideast_afp/iraqreligionashurasecurity 

[iv]http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm?id=ZW20101213000054&l=092140101213&zawyaemailmarketing

[v] Ng Wang Hoong. World Pipelines, Oct 2010. Pg 14

[vi] Ibid

[vii] http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/industry-sectors/worleyparsons-wins-rumaila-oil-field-contract-sources/story-e6frg96x-1225968785228

[viii] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66750/mohsen-m-milani/meet-me-in-baghdad

This article was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 16/12/10, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?pageid=49&id=1874

The times, they are a-worryin'

The collapse of Saad Hariri’s government in Lebanon, following the resignation of eleven Hizballah (or Hizballah aligned) ministers, was not unpredictable; the same, however, is not true of the future...  

In November I argued that tensions were on the rise, and a political vacuum would develop if Hizballah left the government under increased pressure.  Justice versus stability was never going to be easy in Lebanon. 

Ever since the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) results were leaked last year, and Hizballah was publically accused of the murder of Rafik Hariri in 2005, the Shi’ah group have been on the defensive, and were not likely to let the UN tribunal accuse and arrest its members peacefully.  The fall of the government, and now absence of an authoritative power in Beirut, coupled with an already weak Lebanese Army, now means that the enforcement capability of Saad Hariri is dramatically reduced.  Indeed, if the STL findings are ever published, it is doubtful they will achieve justice: the political climate is far from that of 2005, when the outrage over the assassination led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces for the first time in decades.

So where to now?

Internally, Lebanon is likely to be tense for some time.  Efforts to form a new government will be tough, as Hizballah may have the power to dismantle the government, yet this does not equate to creative power.  Saad Hariri is still the most likely leader in the medium term, but a shift in coalition politics will be needed for a new government to emerge with any substance.  The Christian groups allied to Hizballah may be worth watching here, as their support could either isolate or reaffirm the weight of the Shi’ah block.

In terms of foreign pressures, most attention will now fall on Iranian influences within the south and eastern Hizballah strongholds, but the most interesting actor may be Syria.  Known as the historical foe of Beirut, Syrian efforts to broker peace in conjunction with Saudi Arabia obviously did not work.  Here, as with the Christian groups, any support of Hizballah will strengthen the hand of Iran greatly.  Do not be surprised, therefore, if Western efforts to stabilise Lebanon increasingly include Syria, along with the Saudis and Turkey.

The greatest fear in all of this is the threat of violence, both on the streets and across borders.  Indeed, from Israel’s point of view, an unchecked Hizballah now free of governmental constraints, sitting on her northern border, will no doubt be unwelcome.

In hoping to avoid violence, the West must be careful not to substitute justice for stability.  Whilst the UN trial continues, efforts should be made to support the internationally recognised body in all of its work, and in the longer term, maintaining Lebanese sovereignty will be crucial to not let Lebanon fall back into the fighting ground of the region's varying influences.  To do this, UN forces must be given strong backing and support from the wider international community.

by John Corner

This article was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 13/01/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1047

A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action

Fighting Islamism head on in a war of words for the malevolent force that it is is all well and good, but to make strides in the struggle, the transatlantic community should also look to the virtue of international development...

Identity politics are a major aspect of the transatlantic community’s ongoing struggle with terrorism.  Ideology, religion and ethnicity all play a pivotal role in generating the friction that has on too many occasions reached an emotional intensity that has lead to repulsive and indefensible acts of terrorism.  Yet, in managing the problem, there is another angle to be explored; the role of development.

Hillary Clinton’s surprise visit to Yemen, the first by a Secretary of State in 20 years, highlighted this stream of consciousness.  "It's not enough to have military-to-military relations [only]," said Clinton.  Instead, she discussed with her audience in Sanaa the need to recalculate US aid to Yemen so as to emphasise social and economic reform. 

Terrorism will likely always occur; as will theft, as will rape, as will murder.  These are sad facts of the human condition.  Look no further than Arizona this week to see that extreme events can occur at the flex of a fanatical lone wolf’s trigger finger.  And so beating terrorism is really about managing the threat.  It is about reducing both the severity and occurrence of terrorist acts and inhibiting the ability of larger coordinated networks to act.

Half the battle is reducing numbers.  There are so called ‘pious’ (read poisonous) clerics who will always incite other fanatics to act.  Here is where we ought to employ the virtue of law enforcement; the reactionary element of a cohesive counterterrorism campaign.  But alongside that, we must focus on development so as to help stop some of those otherwise un-radicalised from becoming so.

Bankrolling Sanaa is not only beneficial for the purpose of allowing Yemen’s government to deal with the Shia Houthi rebels in its north, the secessionist movement in its south and its critical battle with al Qaeda.  No, it can also be beneficial for the purpose of improving infrastructure, enhancing opportunities for economic prosperity and increasing the quality of education for Yemen’s citizens thereby removing a state of being which has driven many to extremism out of frustration.  Of course, it is of equal importance to ensure that the money is spent well and free of corruption, but providing this, the sentiment is clear; more of the same please, Secretary Clinton.

by Dane Vallejo

This blog was originally published by The Henry Jackson Society, 12/01/11, accessed at http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/thescoop.asp?pageid=106&poid=1046